Securities regulators and law enforcement authorities are increasingly active in the application of anti-bribery laws in the global environment. This renewed emphasis on rooting out transnational corruption has substantial implications for participants in the global capital markets engaged in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. More than ever, there is a risk that transactions improperly structured or subjected to inadequate due diligence may result in unexpected criminal or civil liabilities of unprecedented scope and severity. This article is intended as a brief primer on the essentials of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act a summary of the most current global developments in global anti-bribery enforcement, and basic guidance on the due diligence efforts that prudent participants in a cross-border transaction should consider.
Obtaining or retaining business: On its face, this phrase could reasonably be read to limit the FCPA's scope to a prohibition on payments that influence the foreign official to award the payor new contracts or renew existing contracts. In fact, the first two US district court judges to squarely address this issue so held; dismissing, respectively, a criminal indictment and a civil complaint charging the defendants with making or authorizing payments to foreign officials to persuade these officials to reduce their employers' customs duties and tax obligations. 12 But in overturning the first of these decisions and reinstating the indictment, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that 'Congress intended for the FCPA to apply broadly to payments intended to assist the payor, either directly or indirectly, in obtaining or retaining business for some person, and that bribes paid to foreign tax officials to secure illegally reduced customs and tax liability constitute a type of payment that can fall within this broad coverage'. 13 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that payments that beget such benefits assist the payor in obtaining or retaining business by reducing the beneficiary's cost of doing business, thus providing a competitive advantage vis-à-vis its competitors and incentivizing its continued presence in the relevant market. 14 The FCPA also includes an exception and two affirmative defences to the anti-bribery provisions. The exception provides that the anti-bribery provisions shall not apply to 'facilitating or expediting' payments made to foreign officials to 'expedite or to secure the performance of a routine government action'. 15 But this exception applies only to actions that are 'ordinarily and commonly performed' by the official. 16 The statute provides the following examples of qualifying routine actions: obtaining permits or licenses to do business in the country; processing government papers (eg visas and work orders); providing police protection, mail services or scheduling inspections; providing utility (eg phone, power, water) and cargo handling services and 'actions of a similar nature'.
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Routine governmental action will never include, however, actions relating to the decision to award new or continue existing business.
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The anti-bribery provisions' two affirmative defences are that: (i) the payment was 'lawful under the written laws and regulations' of the foreign official's country; and (ii) the payment was to reimburse a foreign official for 'reasonable and bona fide expenditure [s] , such as travel and lodging expenses', incurred in relation to the promotion or demonstration of the payor's products or services or the execution or performance of a contract between the payor and the foreign official's employer.
to use a product), practices such as upgrading the official's flight accommodations, inviting his family members, detouring him to tourist destinations unrelated to the contract and providing him with 'pocket money' during the trip have all formed the basis of FCPA prosecutions. 20 The accounting provisions The FCPA's accounting provisions are two-fold. The 'books-and-records' provision requires that 'issuers' (as that term will be defined subsequently) 'make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer'. 21 The 'internal controls' provision requires that issuers 'devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that': (i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's directions; (ii) transactions are recorded in a manner that facilitates preparation of financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and to maintain accountability for assets; (iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's directions; and (iv) recorded assets are periodically compared to assets on hand with reconciliation of discrepancies. 22 The accounting provisions apply broadly to all records kept and internal controls maintained by US securities registrants, not just those relating to international transactions. Thus, the full extent of their reach is beyond the scope of this article.
Congress included the accounting provisions as a complement to the FCPA's antibribery provisions. The requirement that issuers keep and maintain accurate booksand-records addresses Congress's concern that, prior to the FCPA, issuers were using unrestricted 'off-the-books slush funds' to facilitate illicit payments to foreign officials.
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The internal controls provision requires that issuers have organizational structures with controls designed to prevent improper payments. 24 It was Congress's belief that the accounting provisions, together with the anti-bribery provisions, would 'go a long way' towards enhancing public confidence in the securities markets that corporate recordkeeping is honest.
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To whom does the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act apply The FCPA's accounting provisions apply to 'issuers', defined as any company that has securities registered with the SEC pursuant to Section 12, or that is required to file periodic reports with the SEC pursuant to Section 15, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
26 Notably, this provision applies to foreign companies that sponsor American Depository Receipts ('ADRs'). 27 It also includes any wholly or majority-owned subsidiary (foreign or domestic) of an issuer. With respect to subsidiaries in which issuers have an ownership interest of 50% or less, issuers are only required to make 'good faith' efforts to exercise their influence to cause these minority-owned entities to maintain a system of internal accounting controls.
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The anti-bribery provisions generally apply more broadly. In addition to issuers, 29 these provisions also apply to 'domestic concerns' 30 -which include US citizens, nationals and residents, as well as business entities that have their principal place of business in the United States or which are organized under the laws of a state or territory of the United States-and foreign citizens and businesses who act or cause an act in furtherance of a corrupt payment within the territory of the United States. 31 The antibribery provisions also apply to any officer, director, employee, agent or stockholder of an issuer or domestic concern acting on behalf of the issuer or domestic concern.
32 In perhaps the most famous of the FCPA's agency cases, name partner Sonny Harsono of KPMG's Indonesian member firm, KPMG Siddharta Siddharta & Harsono, authorizedat the behest of an issuer client-an allegedly improper payment to an Indonesian tax official in exchange for reducing the client's tax bill.
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Although the anti-bribery provisions generally do not apply directly to foreign subsidiaries of issuers or domestic concerns (even wholly or majority-owned ones), such entities can nonetheless find themselves subject to these provisions if they act within the United States or act as an agent on behalf of the parent issuer. Their actions may even form the basis of liability for the parent issuer if the parent knew of or consciously disregarded a risk (eg ignoring a red flag) of the subsidiary's illicit payments.
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What are the consequences of violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
As noted previously, violations of the FCPA have both criminal and civil ramifications. Criminal penalties for violating the anti-bribery provisions carry the potential for up to five years imprisonment and/or $100,000 in fines for individuals 35 and up to $2 million in fines for companies. 36 But the DOJ routinely seeks and obtains criminal fines substantially in excess of these statutory maximums by invoking the Alternative Fines 27 ADRs are receipts issued by US depository banks representing an interest in a foreign security held abroad by an agent of the depository. They effectively allow US investors to own foreign stock without having to engage in cross-border transactions. 28 15 USC x 78m(b)(6). 29 15 USC x 78dd-1(a), (g). 30 15 USC x 78dd-2(a), (i). 31 15 USC x 78dd-3(a). Acts within the United States subjecting foreign persons to liability under this provision have been as seemingly inconsequential as an e-mail transmitting a budget from which funds for improper payments were to be made. See United States v Syncor Taiwan, Inc., 02-cr-01244 (CD Cal. 2002) . See also discussion supra at 8. 32 15 USC xx 78dd-1(a), (g); 78dd-2(a), (i The civil enforcement responsibilities for the FCPA are shared between the DOJ and SEC, with the SEC empowered to seek civil penalties and injunctive relief against issuers (and their agents) and the DOJ against domestic concerns and foreign persons. 39 In practice, the DOJ has brought relatively few civil actions, leaving the bulk of the statute's civil enforcement to the SEC. One reason for this-in addition to the fact that the DOJ has criminal enforcement alternatives where the SEC does not-may be that the maximum that the DOJ may seek as a civil penalty is $10,000 per violation, while the SEC may seek up to the greater of $100,000 for a natural person or $500,000 for an issuer and the 'gross amount of the pecuniary gain' from the offence. 40 Moreover, as an adjunct to its civil enforcement powers, the SEC has recently begun seeking disgorgement of ill-gotten profits in FCPA prosecutions. 
Omega Advisors
On 6 July 2007, US hedge fund Omega Advisors, Inc. entered into a non-prosecution agreement 43 with the DOJ to resolve the government's investigation into Omega's investment in a privatization programme in the Republic of Azerbaijan. According to the agreement, Omega invested more than $100 million in an effort to privatize the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic ('SOCAR') while knowing that its investment partner-Victor Kozeny of Oily Rock Ltd and Minaret Group Ltd-had entered into arrangements with officials of SOCAR and the Azerbaijan State Property Commission, which oversaw the privatization programme, giving those officials a financial interest in SOCAR's privatization. 44 The items of value allegedly provided to the Azeri officials included millions of dollars in cash, the promise of a two-thirds share in any profits realized by Oily Rock from the SOCAR privatization, $300 million in shares of Oily Rock, $600,000 worth of jewelry and other luxury items and the payment of medical treatments in the United States. 45 Omega, which lost all of its investment when the SOCAR privatization effort failed, agreed to forfeit $500,000 to the DOJ as part of the nonprosecution agreement. The Omega resolution is the most recent in a string of FCPA cases arising out of the failed attempt to privatize SOCAR. In 2004, former Omega partner Clayton Lewis pleaded guilty to a two-count criminal information charging him with violations of the anti-bribery provisions and conspiracy to commit the same. 46 The SOCAR cases raise a number of issues of specific interest to capital market participants, particularly the substantive and jurisdictional FCPA theories advanced by the DOJ. The government's substantive theory of FCPA liability for Lewis-and by extension through the principle of respondeat superior, Omega Advisors-is that Lewis invested in the SOCAR privatization effort while knowing that Kozeny had entered into arrangements giving Azeri officials an interest in the privatization and 'with the understanding that [he] . Prosecutions under the FCPA generally must be filed within five years of the completion of the crime. 18 USC x 3282. But the DOJ may seek a court order suspending the statute-oflimitations for up to three years while it makes an 'official request' (eg letter rogatory) from a foreign sovereign to obtain evidence located in a foreign country. 18 USC x 3292. Although the DOJ obtained such an order in connection with this investigation, the court held that the judicial tolling order was not obtained until after the statute-of-limitations on the FCPA counts had expired. Kozeny, 2007 US Dist. LEXIS at that the venture will receive an improper advantage by virtue of unlawful payments tendered to foreign officials will be liable under the FCPA. The jurisdictional theory advanced in Kozeny's indictment is that Kozeny-a Czech national and Irish citizen who headed the operations of two companies (Oily Rock and Minaret) incorporated in the British Virgin Islands and based in Azerbaijan-is subject to the FCPA because the majority of the investors in Oily Rock and Minaret were US citizens. Because US citizens are 'domestic concerns' under 15 USC section 78dd-2(h)(1)(A) and because Kozeny was allegedly the agent of these investors, the DOJ asserts that he is an 'agent' of a 'domestic concern' subject to the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions pursuant to 15 USC section 78dd-2(a). This theory, while not yet tested before a judicial body, should grab the attention of anyone who solicits money from US citizens to invest in industries outside of the United States.
Si Chan Wooh
On 29 June 2007, Schnitzer Steel executive Si Chan Wooh pleaded guilty to a criminal conspiracy to violate the FCPA's anti-bribery and books-and-records provisions and entered into a civil settlement arising from the same conduct. 52 The DOJ and SEC filings allege that over a five-year period Wooh made and authorized more than $200,000 in corrupt payments to officials of government owned steel producers in China, and $1.7 million in bribes to managers of privately owned steel producers in China and South Korea, to induce these officials to purchase scrap metal from Schnitzer. Although the terms of Wooh's plea agreement are not yet public-he is currently scheduled to be sentenced on 17 September 2007-Wooh's SEC settlement requires him to disgorge approximately $15,000 in bonus commissions (plus pre-judgment interest of approximately $1,000) he received in connection with the tainted contracts and to pay a $25,000 civil penalty. Wooh's guilty plea followed a criminal and administrative resolution by his employer in October 2006 arising from the same course of conduct. Schnitzer Steel entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ and consented to an administrative ceaseand-desist order from the SEC on anti-bribery and books-and-records charges. Sanctions in these actions have been severe-with jail terms as high as three yearsfinancial assessments as high as $114,675.
57 But even these stiff sanctions fall well short of the highest penalties doled out in the history of individual FCPA prosecutions: seven years imprisonment and $1,741,453 in criminal fines in the 1994 prosecution of Herbert Steindler. 58 Second, the Wooh case is significant because it demonstrates that even payments to private, non-government officials can violate the FCPA if they are not accurately accounted for in the company's books-and-records. According to the SEC's complaint, Wooh caused his employer to violate the books-and-records provision with respect to the bribes paid to private industry members 'by failing to properly account for and disclose the bribes in [Schnitzer's] internal records and public filings'.
Third, the Wooh case-albeit a negotiated settlement and thus without formal precedential effect-presents an expansive interpretation of the books-and-records provision. Included in the criminal information is a chart that details the descriptions of the company's accounting entries for the payments to the foreign officials. Some of these payments were logged as 'Gratuity to Customer Representative' and 'Gratuity Commission to Customer'. It is difficult to posit how Schnitzer Steel could have more precisely recorded these transactions, suggesting that the DOJ views the books-andrecords provision as requiring not only an objectively accurate description, but also a normative tag (eg 'bribe') when recording an improper payment.
Baker Hughes
In the largest FCPA settlement to date, on 26 April 2007 the DOJ and SEC announced criminal and civil actions-worth a combined $44 million-against Houston-based oilfield services contractor Baker Hughes, Inc. and its wholly owned subsidiary Baker Hughes Services International, Inc. ('BHSI'). Baker Hughes and BHSI acknowledged in their respective resolutions with the DOJ that BHSI paid approximately $4.1 million to an Isle of Man-based consulting firm knowing that portions of these payments were intended to bribe an official of Kazakhoil, then Kazakhstan's state oil company, to influence this official in awarding business to BHSI. Baker Hughes's settlement with the SEC covered a broader range of conduct, involving contracts in Angola, Indonesia, Nigeria, Uzbekistan and Russia in addition to Kazakhstan, and implicated additional Baker Hughes subsidiaries.
In its settlement with Baker Hughes, the DOJ agreed to defer prosecution for a threecount criminal information charging the company with violating the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions, conspiring to violate the same, and willfully falsifying its books and records. Baker Hughes's settlement with the SEC included charges that it violated the FCPA's antibribery, books-and-records and internal controls provisions, and that it violated a ceaseand-desist order entered in connection with a 2001 FCPA settlement with the SEC. 60 BHSI pleaded guilty to a three-count criminal information charging it with violating the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions, conspiring to violate the same, and aiding and abetting in the falsification of parent company Baker Hughes's books-and-records. 61 In connection with the SEC settlement, Baker Hughes agreed to: (i) disgorge nearly $20 million in profits from the relevant transactions; (ii) pay more than $3 million in prejudgment interest; (iii) pay a $10 million civil penalty for violating the 2001 ceaseand-desist order; (iv) cease and desist from future violations of the FCPA; and (v) retain an independent compliance consultant to review Baker Hughes's compliance programme and monitor the implementation of new internal controls related to the FCPA. BHSI agreed to pay an $11 million criminal fine in connection with its guilty plea. There was no monetary assessment associated with Baker Hughes's deferred prosecution agreement, but Baker Hughes agreed to abide by various terms of probation, including the independent compliance consultant, during the deferred prosecution agreement's twoyear term. If Baker Hughes violates these terms, it will be subject to prosecution for the presently deferred three-count criminal information.
Separate from the respective corporate resolutions, the SEC charged Roy Fearnley, Baker Hughes's former Business Development Manager for Kazakhstan, with aiding and abetting Baker Hughes's FCPA violations. Fearnley, a British national residing in Kazakhstan, has yet to enter an appearance.
In addition to setting the record as the highest FCPA monetary resolution to date, the Baker Hughes case is also significant for several other reasons. First, and foremost, the SEC's assessment of a $10 million civil penalty for Baker Hughes's violation of its 2001 cease-and-desist order is the first of its kind in the FCPA context. Noting that Baker Hughes committed the instant FCPA violations while subject to the cease-and-desist order, SEC Director of Enforcement Linda Thomsen said, 'The $10 million penalty demonstrates that companies must adhere to Commission Orders and that recidivists will be punished.'
62 Because SEC orders are of indefinite duration, imposition of such an order or consent to a judicial injunction may expose a company to additional jeopardy for a significant period of time. The Baker Hughes resolution also illustrates the desire of US authorities that defendants engage an independent compliance consultant to assure future FCPA compliance. At Baker Hughes's expense, an outside consultant chosen by Baker Hughes but approved by the DOJ and SEC will undertake a comprehensive review of the company's internal controls. The consultant will issue a report with recommendations that Baker Hughes must adopt unless it can convince the consultant that they are unduly burdensome and that a less burdensome alternative would satisfy the consultant's concerns equally as well. The consultant will then periodically review the implementation of the recommendations over the next three years. If at any time during this period the consultant discovers additional violations of the FCPA, the consultant will be obligated to report them to the DOJ and SEC.
Appointment of an independent compliance consultant is a significant corporate event. Without discounting the utility of a new and focused perspective on FCPA compliance that should (hopefully) prevent future FCPA violations, compliance consultants are expensive, may continue to distract employees and officers-who by that point have already undergone a substantial internal and/or federal investigationfrom their business mission, and have an obligation to report any new violations to the US government. Some companies have managed to avoid the imposition of compliance consultants by voluntarily revamping their compliance systems and/or retaining their own consultants prior to reaching a resolution with government authorities. 65 This may well be a worthwhile alternative for companies that discover FCPA problems.
Dow Chemical
On 13 February 2007, the SEC filed settled civil and administrative actions charging The Dow Chemical Company with having violated the FCPA's books-and-records and internal controls provisions. 66 According to the civil complaint, DE-Nocil Crop Protection, Ltd, a 'fifth-tier foreign subsidiary' of Dow Chemical's based in Mumbai, India, provided approximately $200,000 in 'improper payments and gifts' to federal and state agriculture officials in India to facilitate the licencing approval and distribution of its pesticides. Dow Chemical consented to the entry of an administrative cease-and-desist order and agreed to pay a $325,000 civil penalty. The primary significance of this settlement lies in the aggressive assertion of jurisdiction by the SEC over a matter with little connection to the United States.
The complaint identifies DE-Nocil as a 'fifth-tier foreign subsidiary' of Dow Chemical. Moreover, the administrative cease-and-desist order explicitly states that DE-Nocil's payments to Indian officials were made 'without knowledge or approval of any Dow employee', thus removing an agency theory of liability for Dow Chemical. The SEC's assertion of jurisdiction must therefore have been premised on the theory that DE-Nocil's books-and-records were ultimately 'folded-up' five levels into Dow Chemical's ledgers-by which point they would have been aggregated and re-aggregated several times over-and that Dow Chemical, an employer of 43,000, was responsible for the failure of low-level sales employees to follow corporate policies some 8,000 miles removed from Midland, Michigan where said policies were formulated.
The Dow Chemical settlement is also noteworthy for the insignificant amount of the payments to the foreign officials. According to the SEC's complaint, most of the improperly recorded payments to the Indian officials were 'well under $100'. Virtually impossible to identify during an audit, double digit payments forming the basis for FCPA liability demonstrates the importance of impressing FCPA compliance upon line-level personnel responsible for authorizing and booking charges in high-risk countries.
El Paso
On 7 February 2007, the DOJ and SEC announced that they had reached settlements with El Paso Corporation arising out of El Paso's involvement in the United Nations Oil-forFood Programme ('OFFP' or the 'Programme'). 67 According to the SEC's complaint, El Paso violated the books-and-records and internal controls provisions by purchasing oil from third parties that had themselves made approximately $5.5 million in 'illegal surcharge payments' in connection with their own purchase of the oil directly from the then Iraqi government. El Paso knew or should have known, the complaint states, that these third parties had paid the 'kickbacks' and were passing the surcharges through to El Paso. El Paso then improperly recorded the whole of the purchase price from these third parties as 'cost of goods sold'.
In settling the SEC's complaint, El Paso agreed to pay a $2,250,000 civil penalty and to disgorge $5.48 million in 'profits', the latter to be satisfied as part of El Paso's agreement with the DOJ. El Paso's resolution with the DOJ took the form of a non-prosecution agreement whereby El Paso agreed to forfeit the $5.48 million 'in illegal surcharges paid . . . by third parties from whom El Paso purchased Iraqi oil' to the United States for transfer to the Development Fund of Iraq as 'restitution for the benefit of the people of Iraq'. investigation into alleged corruption surrounding the OFFP. 69 The IIC accused 2,253 companies worldwide of having provided more than $1.8 billion in illicit payments to the Iraqi government.
Nearly two dozen companies have publicly disclosed that they are under investigation by the DOJ and/or SEC for OFFP conduct. Although El Paso is the first to settle FCPArelated charges arising from the OFFP scandal, several others are reportedly nearing a settled resolution. 70 It is interesting to note, however, that what may be the largest FCPA investigation to date may not even involve the FCPA's bread-and-butter: anti-bribery charges. That is because the OFFP investigation presents the unusual circumstance where the allegedly unlawful payments were demanded by and made to a foreign government, not a foreign official. 71 
Vetco International
On 6 February 2007, the DOJ announced that three subsidiaries of Vetco International Ltd had agreed to plead guilty-a fourth entered into a deferred prosecution agreement-to violations of the anti-bribery provisions and conspiracy to commit the same. 72 According to the plea agreements, from 2002 to 2005 the Vetco subsidiaries authorized a freight forwarding company to make at least 378 separate payments totaling $2.1 million to Nigerian customs officials in order to induce these officials to afford them preferential treatment in the customs process. The $26 million combined criminal fine associated with the guilty pleas is the largest in the history of FCPA. The Vetco subsidiaries were also required to retain an independent consultant to assist them in creating and maintaining a robust compliance programme.
The Vetco case illustrates the potential complications that businesses face when acquiring companies with unresolved FCPA liability. In 2003, the predecessor to one of the Vetco subsidiaries, ABB Vetco Gray UK, uncovered evidence of FCPA violations in Nigeria while negotiating its acquisition by a consortium of investors. ABB Vetco Gray UK management and the acquiring investment group thereafter conducted a comprehensive FCPA compliance review. According to a DOJ report, ABB Vetco Gray and its prospective acquirers reviewed more than four million pages of documents, conducted over 165 interviews of current and former employees, and visited more than 21 countries to analyze hundreds of thousands of transactions stored locally as part of their internal investigation. Ultimately, in 2001, ABB Vetco Gray UK settled with the DOJ and SEC on criminal and civil anti-bribery, books-and-records and internal controls charges relating to the company's operations in Nigeria. 74 The acquiring companies then obtained a written opinion from the DOJ that they would not be prosecuted for the pre-acquisition conduct of ABB. 75 But when the DOJ discovered in connection with the 2007 FCPA case against Vetco Gray UK that the payments in Nigeria had in fact continued through at least mid-2005-a full year after the acquisition-it levied the highest criminal fine in FCPA history. For more on the subject of FCPA liability arising from M&A activity, see Section 5 subsequently.
Statoil
On 13 October 2006, the DOJ and SEC announced that Statoil ASA, a Norwegian oil company whose ADRs are traded on the New York Stock Exchange, had agreed to pay a total of $21 million to settle criminal and administrative charges of violating the antibribery and accounting provisions. Statoil admitted that it made two bribe payments totalling $5.2 million through a third-party consultant to an Iranian official in order to obtain non-public information-such as competitors' bid documents-relating to a lucrative procurement from the Iranian government. Pursuant to a deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ, Statoil agreed to a $10.5 million criminal penalty and the appointment of an independent compliance consultant who will review and report on Statoil's FCPA compliance. 76 In the parallel SEC administrative proceeding, Statoil consented to the entry of an administrative order requiring the company to cease and desist from committing future FCPA violations, and to disgorge $10.5 million. 77 The Statoil matter marked the first time that the DOJ has taken criminal enforcement action against a foreign issuer for violating the FCPA. 78 Assistant Attorney General Alice
Fisher, head of the DOJ's Criminal Division, noted that this case was intended to send 'a clear message' to foreign companies trading on the American exchanges that they too must comply with US anti-bribery laws, adding, '[t]his prosecution demonstrates the Justice Department's commitment vigorously to enforce the FCPA against all international businesses whose conduct falls within its scope'.
International foreign bribery enforcement International conventions against foreign bribery
For many years, the FCPA was the only law directed at punishing the extraterritorial bribery of foreign officials. But even the FCPA was incapable of reaching every instance of multinational graft, subjecting only those companies with some nexus to the United States to its restrictions. Congress, as part of the 1988 amendments to the FCPA, expressed its concern that US companies were being disadvantaged in this regard vis-à-vis their international competitors, some of which were not only unrestricted in their domestic laws from international bribery, but were able to deduct the cost of such bribes from their annual tax assessments. Accordingly, Congress directed the Executive Branch to commence negotiations with the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development ('OECD') regarding the development of an international treaty covering acts then prohibited under the FCPA. 80 After nearly a decade of US lobbying for an international counterpart to the FCPA, on 21 November 1997 34 countries signed the OECD's Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. 81 Modelled in large part on the FCPA, the OECD Convention requires, inter alia, that signatories undertake to establish that it is a criminal offence under domestic law to: promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage . . . to a foreign official . . . in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of international business. 82 The Convention also requires signatories to adopt legislation similar to the FCPA's accounting provisions 83 and provides for extradition among Member States as well as for other forms of international legal assistance. 84 Currently there are 38 signatories to the Convention, including all 30 members of the OECD and eight non-OECD Member States. 85 In addition to the OECD Convention, a number of significant regional treaties concerning international bribery have taken effect across the globe in recent years, including: the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption; 86 90 The most recent development on the international treaty front is the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. 91 Although it is too early to assess the impact of this treaty on international foreign bribery enforcement-it was ratified but 18 months ago on 14 December 2005-its symbolic importance alone is undeniably important.
International prosecutions for foreign bribery
With legislation passed pursuant to the various international conventions discussed before (primarily the OECD), the vast majority of the world's major economies have implemented laws against foreign corruption. 92 But these legislative efforts notwithstanding, prosecutions outside of the United States have been relatively slow to develop. An OECD working group chartered to assess the actual enforcement of anti-bribery laws by OECD signatories has reported concerns about whether the application of sanctions to date has been 'effective, proportionate and dissuasive', and concluded that there appears to be a 'lack of a firm, proactive approach to investigating and prosecuting foreign bribery'. 93 That said, European authorities have become much more active of late. Several recent, high profile investigations are discussed subsequently:
Oil-for-Food programme investigations (multi-national)
With a budget of $36 million, a staff of nearly 100 attorneys, accountants and lawenforcement agents, and offices in Baghdad, New York and Paris, the IIC's OFFP investigation, referenced at pages 12-13 above, is likely the largest international corruption investigation ever. The IIC's mandate was to investigate: (i) mismanagement and maladministration of the OFFP by UN personnel and agents; (ii) illicit or corrupt activities involving the OFFP by UN officials, personnel or agents; and (iii) illicit or corrupt activities involving the OFFP by UN contractors, purchasers of oil and providers of humanitarian aid. 94 The OFFP was the UN's attempt to maintain the integrity of 'temporary measure', the OFFP lasted seven years-from 1996 through the fall of Hussein's regime in 2003-and administered $64.2 billion in petroleum sales and $37 billion in humanitarian aid.
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The IIC found corruption within the UN administration reached as high as Benon Sevan, Under-Secretary-General of the UN and Executive Director of the Office of the Iraqi Programme, the UN agency charged with administering the OFFP.
98 As significant as the IIC's findings of internal UN corruption and general maladministration were, the true core of the IIC's findings involved the Iraqi government's imposition of surcharges on the Programme's oil and humanitarian contractors. Beginning in 2000, the Iraqi government conditioned the right to purchase its oil on the purchaser paying a 'surcharge'-generally between 10 and 30 cents per barrel-to the Iraqi government.
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On the humanitarian side of the Programme, Iraq began requiring contractors to 'kickback' 10% of the value of their contracts to the Iraqi government. 100 In all, the IIC estimated that the Iraqi government collected nearly $1.8 billion from OFFP contractors through these schemes.
For companies without ties to the United States, where the DOJ and SEC immediately initiated their own investigations as described above, the IIC reports were initially little more than an international embarrassment. Although the IIC's findings generated substantial negative press for OFFP contractors, the reports had no legal effect and most nations took little to no initiative to pursue their own investigations. 101 On 9 December 2006, more than a year after the IIC released the last of its investigative reports, former IIC Commissioner Mark Pieth publicly rebuked the international community for its failure to prosecute OFFP-related corruption cases.
102 Now, more than 18 months removed from the IIC's work, the international response to the OFFP corruption allegations finally appears to be making some headway. On 15 November 2006, German authorities conducted coordinated raids of as many as 30 offices and homes of Siemens AG employees searching for evidence of violations of Germany's Act on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials. What has emerged is a wide-ranging and multi-faceted inquiry reportedly focusing on the operations of Siemens's telecommunications unit in Cameroon, Egypt, Greece, Indonesia, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Vietnam and that allegedly involves as much as E420 million in suspicious payments dating back seven years. 109 In an unrelated case involving Siemens, German prosecutors just recently convicted a former finance chief and a consultant from the power generation unit of foreign bribery in a case involving contracts with the Italian utility company Enel SpA. 110 These and other corruption investigations, including the OFFP inquiry referenced above, are presently pending.
BAE Systems (UK and US)
two years (and £2 million) investigating allegations that Britain's largest defence contractor funnelled more than £1 billion to Saudi-controlled bank accounts in Washington, DC for the benefit of members of the Saudi royal family. The payments were allegedly made in connection with the 20-year, £43 billion al Yamamah contract under which BAE provided Saudi Arabia with more than 100 warplanes.
But on 14 December 2006, Attorney General Lord Goldsmith directed the SFO to close its investigation, citing the potential for 'serious damage to UK/Saudi security, intelligence and diplomatic cooperation'. Lord Goldsmith stated that, in this instance, 'the wider public interest' outweighed 'the need to maintain the rule of law'. 111 
Special focus-acquisition due diligence
Given the increasing level of cross-border M&A activity, the FCPA and other international corruption statutes pose important issues for prospective acquirers by virtue of the liabilities they may assume as a matter of corporate law and of institutional culture. There are at least two risks attendant to every acquisition that are significant for FCPA purposes: (i) that the acquirer will assume criminal and/or civil liability for the unlawful pre-acquisition conduct of the target and (ii) that the acquirer will be unable to reform any wayward business practices of the target in time to prevent unlawful payments post-acquisition.
The principle of successor liability
Under traditional principles, a 'successor' is a 'corporation that, through amalgamation, consolidation, or other assumption of interests, is vested with the rights and duties of an earlier corporation'. 118 Whether an acquiring company vests with the liabilities of a target depends, in the first instance, on the structure of the corporate transaction. Under US law, if the acquisition is a merger or consolidation-meaning that the target loses its corporate form and is absorbed entirely into the acquiring company-the acquiring company assumes the liabilities of the target. 119 But if the acquisition is structured as an asset sale or stock purchase, absent an express agreement to do so the acquiring company generally does not assume the liabilities of the target as long as it continues in its separate existence.
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The prospect of imposing successor liability on an acquiror itself 'innocent' of the conduct at issue bears broad policy ramifications, including the potential to chill market efficient M&A activity. Fortunately, the DOJ and SEC have exercised restraint in this regard, with only two SEC civil/administrative actions against an acquiror for preacquisition conduct of a target between them in the history of FCPA enforcement. 121 Even in these two instances, the 2004 acquisition of InVision Technologies by the General Electric Company and the 2007 acquisition of Delta & Pine by Monsanto, the conduct at issue was discovered prior to the closing date of the acquisition, presumably meaning that GE and Monsanto at least had the option of walking away from the acquisitions (and their attendant FCPA liability).
But just because US enforcement authorities have thus far exercised their discretion not to bring successor liability prosecutions does not mean that the prospect alone does not have significant M&A implications. One recent acquisition was reportedly abandoned because the putative target was unable to resolve its FCPA issues prior to the expected closing date with the would-be acquirer. 122 At least two more acquisitions in recent years-although ultimately consummated-were delayed until settlements were reached with the targets resolving their respective FCPA liabilities. 123 Shortly after the announcement of each of these settlements, the DOJ issued formal opinions delineating circumstances in which the DOJ will not assert successor liability against an acquirer for the prior FCPA violations of an acquired foreign subsidiary. 124 Among the factors enumerated were the commitment to investigate the violations once they were known, full disclosure and cooperation with the government, discipline imposed on personnel involved in the activity, imposition of an adequate compliance programme and implementation of strengthened internal controls.
Due diligence checklist
The principal vaccine for the successor liability malady is stringent pre-acquisition due diligence. In each of the cases cited immediately above, the improper payments were discovered during due diligence, thus enabling the acquiror to re-evaluate the transaction and, in most instances, insist that the would-be target resolve its FCPA liabilities preacquisition as part of or incident to the acquisition. The DOJ's lead criminal prosecutor has publicly stated her belief that '[t]ransactional due diligence in the FCPA context is good for business'. 125 And the SEC, in a recent FCPA settlement, deliberately alleged that the improper payments at issue were made possible by the acquiror's decision to complete the acquisition of the subsidiary who would ultimately make the payments post-acquisition notwithstanding the acquiror's discovery during due diligence that 'illicit payments to government officials . . . were portrayed as necessary' in the subsidiary's business. 126 Adequate M&A due diligence 'best practices' increasingly include specific inquiries designed to ferret out potential FCPA violations so they can be considered as part of the overall transaction terms and necessary remediation and reporting steps taken.
Of course, no one due diligence 'checklist' can be crafted to apply to all situations, as each potential acquisition is driven by individual facts and circumstances, including the acquirer's appetite for risk or offsetting terms. Yet, acquirers and their advisers, investment bankers, accountants and attorneys may well consider some of the following steps: 127 
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Evaluate the target's compliance programme, particularly with respect to the FCPA and other international corruption laws:
Is there a code of conduct provision or other form of recognition of anti-bribery protocols?
Is there an adequate 'whistleblower' or similar mechanism for company personnel to report suspected bribery?
Is there a basic understanding of these principles both 'at the top' in the ranks of upper management and 'in the field' where interactions with government officials are taking place?
